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A game–theoretic approach for Generative Adversarial Networks
Barbara Franci and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract—Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a
class of generative models, known for producing accurate sam-
ples. The key feature of GANs is that there are two antagonistic
neural networks: the generator and the discriminator. The main
bottleneck for their implementation is that the neural networks
are very hard to train. One way to improve their performance
is to design reliable algorithms for the adversarial process.
Since the training can be cast as a stochastic Nash equilibrium
problem, we rewrite it as a variational inequality and introduce
an algorithm to compute an approximate solution. Specifically,
we propose a stochastic relaxed forward–backward algorithm
for GANs. We prove that when the pseudogradient mapping of
the game is monotone, we have convergence to an exact solution
or in a neighbourhood of it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are an example
of generative models. Specifically, the model takes a training
set, consisting of samples drawn from a probability dis-
tribution, and learns how to represent an estimate of that
distribution [1]. GANs focus primarily on sample generation,
but it is also possible to design GANs that can estimate the
probability distribution explicitly [1]. The subject has been
recently studied, especially because it has many practical
applications on various topics. For instance, they can be
used for medical purposes, i.e., to improve the diagnostic
performance for the low-dose computed tomography method
[2], for polishing images taken in unfavourable weather
conditions (as rain or snow) [3]. Other applications range
from speech and language recognition, to playing chess and
vision computing [4].
The idea behind GANs is to train the generative model
via an adversarial process, in which also the opponent is
simultaneously trained. Therefore, there are two neural net-
work classes: a generator that captures the data distribution,
and a discriminator that estimates the probability that a
sample came from the training data rather than from the
generator. The generative model can be thought of as a
team of counterfeiters, trying to produce fake currency, while
the discriminative model, i.e., the police, tries to detect the
counterfeit money [1]. The competition drives both teams
to improve their methods until the counterfeit currency
is indistinguishable from the original. To succeed in this
game, the counterfeiter must learn to make money that are
indistinguishable from original currency, i.e. the generator
network must learn to create samples that are drawn from
the same distribution as the training data [5].
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Since each agent payoff depends on the other agent,
the problem can be described as a game. Therefore, these
networks are called adversarial. However, GANs can be
also thought as a game with cooperative players since they
share information with each other [1] and since there are
only the generator and the discriminator, it is an instance
of a two-player game. Moreover, depending on the cost
functions, it can also be considered as a zero-sum game.
From a mathematical perspective, the class of games that
suits the GAN problem is that of stochastic Nash equilibrium
problems (SNEPs) where each agent aims at minimizing its
expected value cost function, approximated via a number of
samples of the random variable.
Given their connection with optimization and game the-
ory, GANs have received theoretical attention as well, for
modelling as Nash equilibrium problems [6], [7] and for
designing algorithms to improve the training process [8], [7].
From a game theoretic perspective, an elegant approach to
compute a SNE is to cast the problem as a stochastic varia-
tional inequality (SVI) [9] and to use an iterative algorithm to
find a solution. The two most used methods for SVIs studied
for GANs are the gradient method [10], known also as
forward–backward (FB) algorithm [11], and the extragradient
(EG) method [12]. The iterates of the FB algorithm involve
an evaluation of the pseudogradient and a projection step.
They are known to converge if the pseudogradient mapping
is cocoercive or strongly monotone [13], [14]. Such technical
assumptions are quite strong if we consider that in GANs the
mapping is rarely monotone. In contrast, the EG algorithm
converges for merely monotone operators but taking two
projections into the local constraint set per iteration, thus
making the algorithm computationally expensive.
In this paper we propose a stochastic relaxed FB (SRFB)
algorithm, inspired by [15], for GANs. A first analysis of
the algorithm for stochastic (generalized) NEPs is currently
under review [16]. The SRFB requires a single projection
and single evaluation of the pseudogradient algorithm per
iteration. The advantage of our proposed algorithm is that
it is less computationally demanding than the EG algorithm
even if it converges under the same assumptions. Indeed,
we prove its convergence under mere monotonicity of the
pseudogradient mapping when a huge number of samples is
available. Alternatively, if only a finite number of samples is
accessible, we prove that averaging can be used to converge
to a neighbourhood of the solution.
II. GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS
The basic idea of generative adversarial networks (GANs)
is to set up a game between two players: the generator
and the discriminator. The generator creates samples that
are intended to come from the same distribution as the
training data. The discriminator examines the samples to
determine whether they are real or fake. The generator is
therefore trained to fool the discriminator. Typically, a deep
neural network is used to represent the generator and the
discriminator. Accordingly, the two players are denoted by
two functions, each of which is differentiable both with
respect to its inputs and with respect to its parameters.
The generator is represented by a differentiable function
g, that is, a neural network class with parameter vector xg ∈
Ωg ⊆ R
ng . The (fake) output of the generator is denoted
with g(z, xg) ∈ R
q where the input z is a random noise
drawn from the model prior distribution, z ∼ pz, that the
generator uses to create the fake output g(z, xg) [6]. The
actual strategies of the generator are the parameters xg that
allows g to produce the fake output.
The discriminator is a neural network class as well, with
parameter vector xd ∈ Ωd ⊆ R
nd and a single output
d(v, xd) ∈ [0, 1] that indicates the accuracy of the input v. We
interpret the output as the probability that the discriminator d
assigns to an element v to be real. Similarly to the generator
g, the strategies of the discriminator are the parameters xd.
The problem can be cast as a two player game, or, depend-
ing on the cost functions, as a zero sum game. Specifically,
in the latter case the mappings Jg and Jd should satisfy the
following relation
Jg(xg, xd) = −Jd(xg, xd). (1)
Often [8], [5], the payoff of the discriminator is given by
Jd(xg, xd) = E[φ(d(·, xd)]− E[φ(d(g(·, xg), xd))] (2)
where φ : [0, 1] → R is a measuring function (typically a
logarithm [5]). The mapping in (2) can be interpreted as the
distance between the real value and the fake one.
In the context of zero sum games, the problem can be
rewritten as a minmax problem
min
xg
max
xd
Jd(xg, xd). (3)
In words, (3) means that the generator aims at minimizing
the distance from the real value while the discriminator wants
to maximize it, i.e. to recognize the fake data.
When the problem is not a zero sum game, the generator
has its own cost function, usually given by [8]
Jg(xg, xd) = E[φ(d(g(·, xg), xd))]. (4)
It can be proven that the two-player game with cost functions
(2) and (4) and the zero-sum game with cost function (2) and
relation (1) are strategically equivalent [6, Th. 10].
III. STOCHASTIC NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS
In this section we formalize the two player game in a more
general form, since our analysis is independent on the choice
of the cost functions. Namely, we consider the problem as a
stochastic Nash equilibrium problem.
We consider a set of two agents I = {g, d}, that represents
the two neural network classes. The local cost function of
agent i ∈ I is defined as
Ji(xi, xj) = Eξ[Ji(xi, xj , ξ(ω))], (5)
for some measurable function Ji : R
n × Rq → R where
n = nd+ng. The cost function Ji of agent i ∈ I depends on
the local variable xi ∈ Ωi ⊆ R
ni , the decisions of the other
player xj , j 6= i, and the random variable ξ : Ξ → R
q that
express the uncertainty. Such uncertainty arises in practice
when it is not possible to have access to the exact mapping,
i.e., when only a finite number of estimates are available. Eξ
represent the mathematical expectation with respect to the
distribution of the random variable ξ(ω)1 in the probability
space (Ξ,F ,P). We assume that E[Ji(x, ξ)] is well defined
for all the feasible x = col(xg, xd) ∈ Ω = Ωg × Ωd
[17]. For our theoretical analysis, we postulate the following
assumptions on the cost function and on the feasible set [17].
Assumption 1: For each i, j ∈ I, i 6= j, the function
Ji(·, xj) is convex and continuously differentiable. 
Assumption 2: For each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is nonempty,
compact and convex. 
Given the decision variables of the other agent, each
player i aims at choosing a strategy xi, that solves its local
optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I : min
xi∈Ωi
Ji (xi, xj) . (6)
Given the coupled optimization problems in (6), the solution
concept that we are seeking is that of stochastic Nash
equilibrium (SNE) [17].
Definition 1: A stochastic Nash equilibrium is a collective
strategy x∗ = col(x∗g , x
∗
d) ∈ Ω such that for all i ∈ I
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
j ) ≤ inf{Ji(y, x
∗
j ) | y ∈ Ωi}.
Thus, a SNE is a set of actions where no agent can decrease
its cost function by unilaterally changing its decision.
To have theoretical guarantees that a SNE exists, we make
further assumptions on the cost functions [17, Ass. 1].
Assumption 3: For each i ∈ I and for each ξ ∈ Ξ,
the function Ji(·, xj , ξ) is convex, Lipschitz continuous,
and continuously differentiable. The function Ji(xi, xj , ·)
is measurable and for each x and its Lipschitz constant
ℓi(xj , ξ) is integrable in ξ. 
Existence of a SNE of the game in (6) is guaranteed, under
Assumptions 1-3, by [17, §3.1] while uniqueness does not
hold in general [17, §3.2].
For seeking a Nash equilibrium, we rewrite the problems
as a stochastic variational inequality. To this aim, let us
denote the pseudogradient mapping as
F(x) =
[
E[∇xgJg(xg, xd)]
E[∇xdJd(xd, xg)]
]
, (7)
where the possibility to exchange the expected value and the
pseudogradient in (7) is assured by Assumption 3. Then, the
associated stochastic variational inequality (SVI) reads as
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Ω. (8)
1From now on, we use ξ instead of ξ(ω) and E instead of Eξ .
Remark 1: If Assumptions 1–3 hold, then a tuple x∗ ∈ Ω
is a Nash equilibrium of the game in (6) if and only if x∗ is
a solution of the SVI in (8) [9, Prop. 1.4.2], [17, Lem. 3.3].
We call these equilibria, variational equilibria (v-SNE).
Moreover, under Assumptions 1-3, the solution set of
SVI(Ω,F) is non empty and compact, i.e. SOL(Ω,F) 6= ∅
[9, Cor. 2.2.5] and a v-SNE exists. 
IV. STOCHASTIC RELAXED FORWARD–BACKWARD WITH
AVERAGING
The first algorithm that we propose (Algorithm 1) is
inspired by [15], [16] and it is a stochastic relaxed forward
backward algorithm with averaging (aSRFB).
Algorithm 1 Stochastic Relaxed Forward–Backward with
averaging (aSRFB)
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi
Iteration k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}: Agent i ∈ {g, d} receives xkj ,
j 6= i, then updates:
x¯ki = (1− δ)x
k
i + δx¯
k−1
i (9a)
xk+1i = projΩi [x¯
k
i − λiF
SA
i (x
k
i , x
k
j , ξ
k
i )] (9b)
Iteration K:
XKi =
1
K
K∑
k=1
xk (10)
We note that the averaging step in (10) was first proposed
for VIs in [10], and it can be implemented in an online
fashion as
XK = (1− λ˜K)X
K−1 + λ˜KxK (11)
where 0 ≤ λ˜K ≤ 1 and X
K = col(XKg , X
K
d ), . We note
that (11) is different from (9a). Indeed, (9a) is a convex
combination of the two previous iterates xk and x¯k−1,
updated at every time k and with a fixed parameter δ, while
the averaging in (11) is a weighted cumulative sum over all
the decision variables xk until time K with time varying
weights λ˜, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The parameter λ˜K can be tuned
to obtain uniform, geometric or exponential averaging [8].
The relaxation parameter δ instead should be bounded.
Assumption 4: In Algorithm 1, δ ∈ [0, 1]. 
To continue our analysis, we postulate the following
monotonicity assumption on the pseudogradient mapping.
This assumption is among the weakest possible for SVIs
[12], [15] and it is common also for GANs [8].
Assumption 5: F as in (7) is monotone, i.e. 〈F(x) −
F(y),x− y〉 ≥ 0 for all x,y ∈ Ω. 
Next, let us define the stochastic approximation of the
pseudogradient [11] as
F SA(x, ξ) =
[
∇xgJg(xg, xd, ξg)
∇xdJd(xd, xg, ξd)
]
. (12)
F SAi , i ∈ I, uses one or a finite number (mini-batch) of
realizations of the random variable ξi. Given the approx-
imation, we postulate the following assumption which is
quite strong yet reasonable in our game theoretic framework
[8]. Let us first define the filtration F = {Fk}, that is, a
family of σ-algebras such that F0 = σ (X0) and Fk =
σ (X0, ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk) for all k ≥ 1, such that Fk ⊆ Fk+1
for all k ≥ 0.
Assumption 6: F SA in (12) is bounded, i.e., there exists
B > 0 such that for x ∈ Ω, E[‖F SA(x, ξ)‖2|Fk] ≤ B. 
For the sake of our analysis, we make an explicit bound
on the feasible set.
Assumption 7: The local constraint set Ω is such that
maxx,y∈Ω ‖x− y‖2 ≤ R2, for some R ≥ 0. 
For all k ≥ 0, we define the stochastic error as
ǫk = F
SA(xk, ξk)− F(xk), (13)
i.e., the distance between the approximation and the exact
expected value. Then, the stochastic error should have zero
mean and bounded variance, as usual in SVI [8], [12].
Assumption 8: The stochastic error in (13) is such that,
for all k ≥ 0, E[ǫk|Fk] = 0 and E[‖ǫ
k‖2|Fk] ≤ σ
2 a.s.. 
As a measure of the quality of the solution, we define the
following error
err(x) = max
x∗∈Ω
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉, (14)
which is known as gap function and it is equal 0 if and only
if x∗ is a solution of the (S)VI in (8) [9, Eq. 1.5.2]. Other
possible measures can be found in [8].
We are now ready to state our first result.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1-8 hold. Let XK be as in
(10), c = 2−δ
2
1−δ and B, R and σ
2 as in Assumptions 6-8.
Then Algorithm 1 with F SA as in (12) gives
E[err(XK)] =
cR
λK
+ (2B2 + σ2)λ.
Thus, limK→∞ E[err(XK)] = (2B2 + σ2)λ.
Proof: See Appendix II.
V. SAMPLE AVERAGE APPROXIMATION
If a huge number of samples is available or it is possible to
compute the exact expected value, one can consider using a
different approximation scheme or a deterministic algorithm.
In the SVI framework, using a finite, fixed number of
samples is called stochastic approximation (SA). It is widely
used in the literature but it often requires the step sizes to be
diminishing, with the results that the iterations slow down
considerably. The approach that is used to keep a fixed step
size is the sample average approximation (SAA) scheme. In
this case, an increasing number of samples is taken at each
iteration and this helps having a diminishing error.
With the SAA scheme, it is possible to prove convergence
to the exact solution without using the averaging step. We
show this result in Theorem 2 but first we provide more
details on the approximation scheme and state some as-
sumptions. The algorithm that we are proposing is presented
in Algorithm 2. The differences with Algorithm 1 are the
absence of the averaging step and the approximation F SAA.
Formally, the approximation that we use is given by
F SAA(x, ξk) =
[
1
Nk
∑Nk
s=1∇xgJi(x
k
g , x
k
d , ξ
(s)
g )
1
Nk
∑Nk
s=1∇xdJi(x
k
d , x
k
g , ξ
(s)
d )
]
(16)
Algorithm 2 Stochastic Relaxed Forward–Backward (SRFB)
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi
Iteration k: Agent i receives xkj for j 6= i, then updates:
x¯ki = (1− δ)x
k
i + δx¯
k−1
i (15a)
xk+1i = projΩi [x¯
k
i − λiF
SAA
i (x
k
i , x
k
j , ξ
k
i )] (15b)
where Nk is the batch size that should be increasing [12].
Assumption 9: The batch size sequence (Nk)k≥1 is such
that Nk ≥ b(k + k0)
a+1, for some b, k0, a > 0. 
With a little abuse of notation, let us denote the stochastic
error also in this case as
ǫk = F SAA(xk, ξk)− F(xk).
Remark 2: Using the SAA scheme, it is possible to prove
that, for some C > 0, E[‖ǫk‖
2|Fk] ≤
Cσ2
Nk
, i.e., the error
diminishes as the size of the batch increases. Details on how
to obtain this result can be found in [12, Lem. 3.12]. 
To obtain convergence, we have to make further assump-
tions on the pseudogradient mapping [15], [12].
Assumption 10: F as in (7) is ℓ-Lipschitz continuous for
ℓ > 0, i.e., ‖F(x)− F(y)‖ ≤ ℓ‖x− y‖ for all x,y ∈ Ω. 
The relaxation parameter should not be too small.
Assumption 11: In Algorithm 2, δ ∈ [ 1+
√
5
2 , 1]. 
Conveniently, with the SAA scheme we can take a con-
stant step size, as long as it is small enough.
Assumption 12: The steps size is such that λ ∈
(0, 12δ(2ℓ+1) ] where ℓ is the Lipschitz constant of F as in
Assumption 10. 
We can finally state our convergence result.
Theorem 2: Let Assumptions 1-5 and 8-12 hold. Then,
the sequence (xk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 2 with F SAA
as in (16) converges a.s. to an SNE of the game in (6).
Proof: See Appendix III.
If one is able to compute the exact expected value, the
problem is equivalent to the deterministic case. Convergence
follows under the same assumptions made for the SAA
scheme with the exception of those on the stochastic error.
Corollary 1: Let Assumptions 1-5 and 9-12 hold. Then,
the sequence (xk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 2 with F as
in (7) converges a.s. to a solution of the game in (6).
Proof: It follows from Theorem 2 or [15, Th. 1].
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present some numerical experiments to
validate the analysis. We propose two theoretical comparison
between the most used algorithms for GANs [8]. In both
the examples, we simulate our SRFB algorithm, the SFB
algorithm [13], the EG algorithm [12], the EG algorithm
with extrapolation from the past (PastEG) [8] and Adam, a
typical algorithm for GANs [18].
All the simulations are performed on Matlab R2019b with
a 2,3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GB LPDDR3 RAM.
A. Illustrative example
In order to make a comparison, we consider the following
zero-sum game which is a problematic example, for instance,
for the FB algorithm [8, Prop. 1].
We suppose that the two players aims at solving the
minmax problem in (3) with cost function
J(xg, xd) = x
⊤
g M(ξ)xd + x
⊤
g a+ x
⊤
d b.
The matrix M(ξ) ∈ Rng×nd is the stochastic part that we
approximate with the SAA scheme. M(ξ) is an antidiagonal
matrix, i.e., Mi,j(ξ) 6= 0 if and only if i + j = n + 1,
and the entries are sampled from a normal distribution with
mean 1 and finite variance. The mapping is monotone and
a ∈ Rng and b ∈ Rnd . The problem is constrained so that
xi ∈ [−1, 1]
ni and the optimal solution is (b,−a). The step
sizes are taken according to Assumption 12.
We plot the distance from the solution, the distance of
the average from the solution, and the computational cost in
Figure 1a, 1b and 1c, respectively.
As one can see from Fig. 1a, the SFB does not converge.
From Fig. 1c instead, we note that the SRFB algorithm is
the less computationally expensive. Interestingly, the average
tends to smooth the convergence to a solution.
B. Classic GAN zero-sum game
A classic cost function for the zero-sum game [1] is
min
xg
max
xd
− log(1 + e−x
⊤
d ω)− log(1 + ex
⊤
d xg).
This cost function is hard to optimize because it is concave-
concave [8]. Here we take ω = −2, thus the equilibrium
is (xg, xd) = (−2, 0). In Figure 2a, 2b and 2c, we show
the distance from the solution, the distance of the average
from the solution, and the computational cost respectively.
Interestingly, all the considered algorithms converge even if
there are no theoretical guarantees.
VII. CONCLUSION
The stochastic relaxed forward–backward algorithm can
be applied to Generative Adversarial Networks. Given a
fixed mini-batch, under monotonicity of the pseudogradient,
averaging can be considered to reach a neighbourhood of the
solution. On the other hand, if a huge number of samples is
available, under the same assumptions, convergence to the
exact solution holds.
APPENDIX I
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We here recall some preliminary results.
The Robbins-Siegmund Lemma is used in literature to
prove a.s. convergence of sequences of random variables.
Lemma 1 (Robbins-Siegmund Lemma, [19]): Let F =
(Fk)k∈N be a filtration. Let {αk}k∈N, {θk}k∈N, {ηk}k∈N and
{χk}k∈N be non negative sequences such that
∑
k ηk <∞,∑
k χk <∞ and let
∀k ∈ N, E[αk+1|Fk] + θk ≤ (1 + χk)αk + ηk a.s.
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Fig. 2: Example VI-B.
Then
∑
k θk < ∞ and {αk}k∈N converges a.s. to a non
negative random variable. 
The next lemma collects some properties that follow from
the definition of the SRFB algorithm.
Lemma 2: Given Algorithm 1, the following hold.
1) xk − x¯k−1 = 1
δ
(xk − x¯k)
2) xk+1 − x∗ = 11−δ (x¯
k+1 − x∗)− δ1−δ (x¯
k − x∗)
3) δ(1−δ)2 ‖x¯
k+1 − xk‖2 = δ‖xk+1 − xk‖2
Proof: Straightforward from Algorithm 1.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: [Sketch] Using the fact that the projection oper-
ator is quasi firmly non expansive [20, Def. 4.1, Prop. 4.16],
applying Lemma 2, the assumptions involved and some norm
properties as the Young’s inequality, it is possible to prove
that, summing over all the iterations and following [8, Th.
2], it holds that
2S〈F(x∗),XK − x∗〉 ≤
∑K
k=1 λ
2E[‖ǫk‖2|Fk]+
+ 2−δ1−δ‖x¯
0 − x∗‖2 + δ‖x0 − x¯−1‖2+
+ 2
∑K
k=1 λ
2E[‖F SA(xk, ξk)‖2|Fk]+
≤ 2−δ
2
1−δ R+ (2B
2 + σ2)
∑K
k=1 λ
2,
(17)
where S = Kλ and
∑K
k=1 λ
2 = Kλ2. Then, it follows that
〈F(x∗),XK − x∗〉 ≤
cR
Kλ
+ (2B2 + σ2)λ.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: [Sketch] Since the projection operator, by [20,
Prop. 12.26], satisfies, for all x, y ∈ C, x¯ = projC(x) ⇔
〈x¯−x, y− x¯〉 ≥ 0 where C is a nonempty closed convex set,
the proof follows similarly to [15, Th. 1]. Specifically, using
the monotonicity assumption and Lemma 2, in combination
with Cauchy-Schwartz and Young’s inequalities and the
cosine rule, we exploit the definition of the stochastic error
and the fact that (using the definition of residual and firmly
non expansiveness of the projection)
res(xk)2 ≤ 2‖xk − xk+1‖2 + 4‖x¯k − x
k‖2 + λ2‖ǫk‖
2.
Thus, it holds that, taking the expected value and using
Remark 2
E[ 11−δ‖x¯
k+1 − x∗‖2|Fk]+
+ E[
(
1
2δ − ℓλ− λ
)
‖xk − xk+1‖2|Fk] ≤
≤ ( 11−δ‖x
∗ − x¯k‖2 + ℓλ‖xk − xk−1‖2 − 14δ res(x
k)2+
+ 2λCσ
Nk
+ 2λCσ
Nk−1
+ λ
δ
Cσ
Nk
− 1
δ
‖xk − x¯k‖2
To use Lemma 1, let αk =
1
1−δ‖x
∗−x¯k‖2+ℓλ‖xk−xk−1‖2,
θk =
1
δ
‖xk−x¯k‖2+ 14δ res(x
k)2, ηk =
2λCσ
Nk
+ 2λCσ
Nk−1
+ λ
δ
Cσ
Nk
.
Applying the Robbins Siegmund Lemma we conclude that
αk converges and that
∑
θk is summable. This implies that
the sequence {x¯k} is bounded and that ‖xk − x¯k‖ → 0.
Therefore {xk} has at least one cluster point x˜. Moreover,
since
∑
θk <∞, res(x
k)2 → 0 and res(x˜)2 = 0.
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